

1 RICHARD J. DOREN, SBN 124666  
rdoren@gibsondunn.com  
2 DANIEL G. SWANSON, SBN 116556  
dswanson@gibsondunn.com  
3 JASON C. LO, SBN 219030  
jlo@gibsondunn.com  
4 GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP  
333 South Grand Avenue  
5 Los Angeles, CA 90071  
Telephone: 213.229.7000  
6 Facsimile: 213.229.7520

7 CYNTHIA E. RICHMAN (D.C. Bar No.  
492089; *pro hac vice*  
8 crichman@gibsondunn.com  
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP  
9 1700 M Street N.W.  
Washington, DC 20036  
10 Telephone: 202.955.8500  
Facsimile: 202.467.0539  
11

12 JULIAN W. KLEINBRODT, SBN 302085  
jkleinbrodt@gibsondunn.com  
13 GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP  
One Embarcadero Center, Suite 2600  
14 San Francisco, CA 94111  
Telephone: 415.393.8200  
15 Facsimile: 415.393.8306

16 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
17 **NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**  
18 **OAKLAND DIVISION**

19 EPIC GAMES, INC.,  
20 Plaintiff, Counter-Defendant  
21 v.  
22 APPLE INC.,  
23 Defendant, Counterclaimant.

MARK A. PERRY, SBN 212532  
mark.perry@weil.com  
JOSHUA M. WESNESKI (D.C. Bar  
No. 1500231; *pro hac vice*)  
joshua.wesneski@weil.com  
WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP  
2001 M Street NW, Suite 600  
Washington, DC 20036  
Telephone: 202.682.7000  
Facsimile: 202.857.0940

Attorneys for Defendant APPLE INC.

Case No. 4:20-cv-05640-YGR

**APPLE INC.'S REPLY IN SUPPORT  
OF ITS MOTION FOR RELIEF  
FROM A NONDISPOSITIVE PRE-  
TRIAL ORDER OF A MAGISTRATE  
JUDGE**

The Honorable Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers

1 **I. EPIC IGNORES THE CONTEXTUAL EVIDENCE**

2 Unable to dispute the Declaration of Apple’s litigation counsel, Jennifer Brown, which  
 3 confirms that the nine documents at issue are protected under the attorney-client privilege and/or  
 4 the work product doctrine (Dkt. 1079-1), Epic resorts to unsupported rhetoric (*e.g.*, Opp. at 5  
 5 (“deceit”)). Epic also attempts to dismiss the indisputable centerpiece of Apple’s submission—  
 6 that the link entitlement was developed in the context of actual pending litigation—as a “red her-  
 7 ring.” (Opp. at 3.) But this Court regularly recognizes the importance of context in considering  
 8 the primary purpose of communications, particularly in circumstances related to legal or regulato-  
 9 ry compliance. *See Staley v. Gilead Scis., Inc.*, 2021 WL 4318403, at \*3 (N.D. Cal. July 16, 2021)  
 10 (“Although the documents by themselves would not always be enough to show that legal advice  
 11 was at issue, ... the documents taken in conjunction with the ... declarations are sufficient to es-  
 12 tablish that communications were made to provide legal advice on business decisions.”); *City of*  
 13 *Roseville Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Apple Inc.*, 2022 WL 3083000, at \*11 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2022)  
 14 (“[T]he content and context of such communications [related to regulatory compliance] must be  
 15 considered in order to determine the primary purpose of the communication”).

16 Epic’s suggestion that Apple “had an opportunity” to present this context to Judge Hixson  
 17 (Opp. at 2) is wrong. Epic sought the immediate production of tens of thousands of documents  
 18 withheld as privileged or protected on a *categorical* basis, and Apple responded to Epic’s argu-  
 19 ments on the same basis, while insisting that “most of Epic’s objections must be analyzed in the  
 20 context of a specific document.” (Dkt. 1039 at 4.) Yet Epic never moved to compel *any* docu-  
 21 ment, and Judge Hixson’s rules precluded Apple from filing a declaration to substantiate its privi-  
 22 lege claims as to the exemplar documents. (Mot. at 2 (citing Judge Hixson Standing Discovery  
 23 Order § 2).) Judge Hixson *sua sponte* reviewed 11 exemplar documents *in camera* and ruled on  
 24 them, without requesting or receiving any further information. (Dkt. 1056.)

25 The Declaration is authorized by this Court’s Rule 7-5(a), which *requires* that “[f]actual  
 26 contentions must be supported by an affidavit or declaration.” Epic’s own case confirms that this  
 27 Court may consider the evidence submitted by Apple yet ignored by Epic. *See United States v.*  
 28

1 *Howell*, 231 F.3d 615, 622 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[I]n making a decision whether to consider newly  
 2 offered evidence, the district court must actually exercise its discretion, rather than summarily  
 3 accepting or denying the motion.”). Courts regularly consider facts in connection with motions  
 4 (see *id.*, 231 F.3d at 623; see also *Shenzhenhai Haitiecheng Sci. & Tech. Co. v. Rearden LLC*,  
 5 2016 WL 5930289, at \*9 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2016)), and due process requires consideration of  
 6 the facts here. Ms. Brown’s Declaration confirms that the documents at issue are protected from  
 7 discovery under applicable law, which is presumably why Epic refuses to engage with it.

## 8 **II. THE DOCUMENTS AT ISSUE ARE PRIVILEGED OR PROTECTED**

9 “The Ninth Circuit privilege test involves the nature, the content, and the context in  
 10 which documents were prepared.” *AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp.*, 2003 WL 21212614, at \*3  
 11 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2003). Judge Hixson’s ruling erred in ignoring the context, as substantiated in  
 12 the undisputed declaration, and should be reversed.

- 13 1. **Draft Analysis Group Deck (Entry Nos. 7077, 44831):** More than just being “sent to law-  
 14 yers” (Opp. at 4), “Apple’s legal department was directly involved in engaging Analysis  
 15 Group,” and litigation counsel “reviewed and commented” on the draft version of the presen-  
 16 tation. Decl. ¶ 3; see also Tr. 548:7-18 (this Court’s decision that “Apple had not adequately  
 17 justified its 30 percent rate” “inform[ed] Apple’s decision” to retain Analysis Group). Alt-  
 18 though the *final* version of this presentation was presented to the business, draft documents  
 19 prepared by a consultant at the direction of a lawyer are privileged or protected, as are attor-  
 20 ney comments on such drafts. *Karma Auto. LLC v. Lordstown Motors Corp.*, 2021 WL  
 21 4147007, at \*2 (C.D. Cal. June 16, 2021) (finding documents prepared by a consulting firm  
 22 engaged “to inform ... legal strategy” where the “consultant was necessary for counsel to ef-  
 23 fectively communicate ... regarding various options” were protected by both attorney-client  
 24 and work-product privilege); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(B) (drafts of expert reports are privi-  
 25 leged). Moreover, this Court protects from disclosure draft documents that could be compared  
 26 to “determine the underlying legal advice provided or incorporated.” *Tsantes v. Biomarin*  
 27 *Pharm. Inc.*, 2022 WL 17974487, at \*2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2022).
- 28 2. **Price Committee Deck (APL-EG\_10682431, Entry No. 16043):** That a Price Committee  
 ultimately engaged in commercial pricing analysis does not mean that the primary purpose of  
 the communication was not legal. Apple claims privilege only over the portions of the draft  
 document that “reflect legal advice from counsel prepared for the purpose of communicating a  
 legal opinion about compliance risk.” Decl. ¶ 5; *Staley v. Gilead Scis. Inc.*, 2021 WL  
 4318403, at \*2 (N.D. Cal. July 16, 2021) (“[I]f an attorney gives a client legal advice on a  
 business decision, that communication is protected by the privilege”); see also *Tsantes*, 2022  
 WL 17974487, at \*2. Compliance with the injunction was a business challenge wrapped in a  
 legal obligation, and the primary purpose of these draft documents (and many others) was the

provision of advice regarding pending litigation.

3. **Draft System Disclosure Sheets (APL-EG\_10680322):** Apple claims privilege only over the draft language that “Apple’s legal department was responsible for drafting and editing” in light of two pending lawsuits. Decl. ¶ 8. Language drafted by a lawyer to ensure compliance with a pending lawsuit (and in view of a separate lawsuit) constitutes both attorney work product and an attorney-client communication. *See Roth v. Aon Corp.*, 254 F.R.D. 538, 541 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (counsel’s involvement in drafting SEC forms is “unsurprising” and “precisely the type of day-to-day guidance for which a corporation would rely on counsel”).
4. **Press Briefing (APL-EG\_10681518):** The redacted portions of the documents “reflect[]” legal advice from Ms. Brown, “as well as legal advice from other in-house counsel and outside counsel.” Decl. ¶ 9. The redactions include “case summary details and [Ms. Brown’s] notes describing [her] interpretation of the landscape of the Injunction, legal interpretation of the Court’s rulings in this matter, and legal interpretation of what would be required of Apple to comply with the Injunction.” *Id.* An attorney’s own “legal analysis and mental impressions” (*see id.*) are protected by the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine. *Klein v. Meta Platforms, Inc.*, 2022 WL 767096, at \*3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2022) (finding communications made to provide public relations support in response to a press inquiry were “made for the primary purpose of giving or receiving legal advice” where “all ... were authored by and/or directed to at least one of Meta’s in house counsel”).
5. **Email Regarding Compliance (APL-EG\_10699646):** Here, “the legal team was intimately involved in providing legal advice relating to public-facing communications” related to “compliance with foreign regulations.” Decl. ¶ 10; *Labbe v. Dometic Corp.*, 2023 WL 5672950, at \*4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2023) (affirming privilege where “counsel worked closely” on drafts to “ensure compliance” with federal law).
6. **Price Committee Deck (Entry No. 2094):** Epic argues that only the “fact that a document was selected” may be privileged (*see* Opp. at 5), but courts hold that while an individual document may have already been produced, the set of documents itself “may reveal an attorney’s thought processes.” *Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 572 Pension Fund v. Cisco Sys., Inc.*, 2005 WL 1459555, at \*6 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2005); *see also James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co.*, 93 F.R.D. 138, 144 (D. Del. 1982) (holding binders of documents selected/compiled by counsel privileged). Here and elsewhere, Epic (like Judge Hixson) ignores the work product doctrine.
7. **Notes From Meeting With Legal (APL-EN\_10682416):** Contrary to Epic’s caricature that Apple claims privilege over “all dates and timelines” (Opp. at 3), Apple actually claims privilege only over the *compliance deadline*, which was “informed extensively by legal counsel” (Decl. ¶ 12). Ms. Brown, whose “focus [is] on potential and active lawsuits or disputes” (*id.* ¶ 1), “communicated closely with outside counsel regarding potential compliance dates” (*id.* ¶ 12). “Outside counsel provided legal advice on the likely date that the Injunction would become effective.” *Id.* The compliance date thus “reflect[s] confidential attorney-client communications.” *Dole v. Milonas*, 889 F.2d 885, 890 (9th Cir. 1989); *cf. Staley v. Gilead Scis., Inc.*, 2021 WL 2416993, at \*2 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2021) (finding patent expiry dates privileged where they were not based on “public information or statute” but “legal analysis”).

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Respectfully submitted:

By: /s/ Mark A. Perry  
WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP

Mark A. Perry

Attorney for Apple Inc.